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commercial law, no less than for English society as a whole,
the nineteenth century was a period of great readjustment. The move
from an agricultural into an industrial economy confronted the courts
with a multiplicity of problems, the successful solution of which demanded not
only legal facility, but also an appreciation of the needs which they represented
and the context from which they arose. Although there is an abundancy of
legal writing on the bill of exchange and the evolution of banking, the development of the bill of lading in relation to commercial banking appears to have
been largely ignored by legal historians. The purpose of this article is to attempt
in some measure to rectify this omission by revealing how the courts adjusted
to and recognized the operations of the factor and the use of the bill of lading
in the financing of international trade in the nineteenth century.
OR ENGLISH

I. OVERSEAS TRADE PATTERNS OF T

NINETEENTH CENTURY

Prior to 1815, the patterns of English foreign trade were somewhat differentiated as between exports and imports. In the importing field trade was carried
on by consignments. Under this pattern the overseas producer would make up
a cargo, generally of raw materials, and ship it to his English correspondent who
would sell it for the producer's account. This system, which had been in operation for many years, was mainly the outcome of the geographic distance between the origin of capital and its actual sphere of operations, and of the technological difference between England and the underdeveloped countries.2 The
absence of any banking facilities in the latter areas made the foreign producer
particularly dependent upon the financial aid which he could obtain from the
merchant; 3 and by so doing, of course, it placed the latter in a position whereby
he could maximize his own resources to the fullest possible extent with a
4
minimum of risk as regards a fall in the market price of the goods.
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I Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), Report from the Select Committee on the Law

Relating to Merchants, Agents or Factors, 4 Session 1823, 17 (henceforth referred to as Parl.
Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823). For a detailed description of this system consult discussion at 258-59 infra.
2
Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842, 144 (1951); 1 Clapham,
An Economic History of Modem Britain 254 (2d ed., 1930).
3Parl. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 7.
4Clapham, op. cit. supra note 2, at 254.
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In the export market, however, the fact that domestic production had not as
yet outstripped the needs of either the foreign or domestic market made the
demands for the former to a large extent both regular and calculable.5 Export
merchandising during this period was thus founded on an order basis: the merchant' purchased the goods outright from the manufacturer and sent them
abroad to meet specific orders or to satisfy the foreseeable requirements of the
7
market generally.
Although the manufacturing output in England had been steadily growing
since the turn of the century, the transition from small to large scale production
gathered greater momentum after 1815.8 The increase in the volume of goods
produced in England after the Napoleonic Wars9 had the effect of upsetting the
' Adam Smith, who saw something of the development in British foreign trade before his
death in 1790, was fond of pointing out that the home trade was more important than the foreign. The progress of Britain's overseas trade quickened remarkably, however, in the last
twenty years of the eighteenth century although the outbreak of war with France in 1793 did
produce a temporary lull in this expansion. The hostilities prevented the new industrial equipment which was then evolving from having its full effects on world markets. Court, A Concise
Economic History of Britain 73-74 (1954).
6The merchant, as distinguished from the factor or commission merchant, was a trader who
dealt in goods mainly for his own account and assumed the risks of loss or depreciation himself.
The factor, as his name implies, bought and sold on the account of others, deriving his profit
from a percentage commission on the amount spent or realized. It was seldom, however, that
individuals engaged exclusively in one of these activities; though in some trades, such as linen,
this did appear to be the rule. When the trader did operate in both capacities, the difference in
nomenclature was based upon a quantitative distinction. Buck, The Development of the Organization of Anglo-American Trade 1800-1850, 5-6 (1925).
7Ibid., at 99-105. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, merchants buying on their own account in the English market still engaged in the old practice of "adventuring"; i.e., purchasing
goods outright, loading them on a hired vessel, and then attempting to seek an outlet for them
abroad. The risk involved in such endeavors was in most instances minimized by the merchants' knowledge of the demands of the foreign markets. After the crises of 1816 and 1825,
however, this method of export lost much of its
popularity, though it still persisted in the more
primitive trades such as grey cotton cloth. Clapham, op. cit. supra note 2, at 254; 2 ibid., at
313; Postan, Credit in Medieval Trade, 1 Econ. Hist. Rev. 234 (1928), reprinted in Essays in
Economic History 105-71 (Carus-Wilson, ed., 1954).
8The following table showing the amount of cotton cloth printed in illustrative years before and after the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) illustrates the phenomenal rate at which
this development took place:
YARDS OF CLOTH PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
Year

Yards

1796
1800
1814
1830

20,621,797
32,869,729
124,613,472
347,450,299

Porter, Progress of the Nation 305 (Hirst, ed., 1912). By 1827-30, the cotton industry accounted for about one-half of the value of British exports. Court, op. cit. supra note 5, at 178.
' Industrial production during this period increased on the average of 3.4 per cent per annum, as compared with 2 per cent during the period 1800-1815. The rate of growth of the English population from 1800-1873 never rose far above 1 per cent. Court, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 177; 2 Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy
625 (1953).
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equilibrium of the market to the extent that the manufacturer could no longer
rely upon specific orders to absorb all of his output. 10 He was thus compelled to
undertake some of the tasks and most of the risks of merchandising in order to
dispose of his surplus. Since it was not in the manufacturer's interest to depress
the domestic market by dumping such surplus at home, a considerable amount
of his efforts was directed toward foreign markets." The impact of this increased
effort upon the methods of dealing that had hitherto prevailed in these areas was
two-fold. Not only did regular export trading to order give way almost entirely
to consignment sales," but the merchant who had been accustomed to controlling the various transactions in this field was forced to change the pattern of
his operations also. Whereas formerly he had undertaken the disposal of most
of these goods abroad for his own account, he now found himself forced to compete with many of the stronger manufacturers. The risks involved in such com-3
petition were altogether too great for the export merchant to accept alone.'
From dealing largely as his own principal before 1815, he moved rapidly into
the role of a mercantile agent, trading, as in the import field, mainly for the
account of others. For the next fifty years or so, he was to dominate the trading
scene not in the dual functional capacity as importer and exporter, but solely
14
as a general commission merchant-a factor.
The reasons for this dominance are not hard to find. Under the consignment
method of trading a domestic manufacturer could send his surplus goods either
directly to his own overseas agent or else to a British merchant situated in
30 Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), Report from the Select Committee on the Present
State of Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping in the United Kingdom, 6 Session 1833, 91
and passim (henceforth referred to as Parl. Papers, Report on Manufactures, 1833). In his
testimony before the Committee, one of the witnesses, a commission merchant, stated that
"[tihe manufacturers in England are obliged to operate upon a very large scale; they have a
regular demand for two-thirds or three-fourths of what they make, and the rest they ship.... "
Ibid., at 93.
" Thus, for example, of approximately three million yards of cotton cloth printed in 1830,
less than half was used in the domestic market. Porter, op. cit. supra note 8, at 305. Based on
official values of this period, exports increased almost ten times from 1800 to 1853. In real value,
however, they just about trebled themselves. Imlah, Real Values in British Foreign Trade
1798-1853, 8 J. Econ. Hist. 133 (1948); Porter, op. cit. supra note 8, at 477, 518.
"Parl. Papers, Report on Manufactures, 1833, 35, 61, 93, 126, 141. Consult also Buck, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 122-24; Greenberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 144.
"3Parl. Papers, Report on Manufactures, 1833, 141. This was especially so in the American market where many of these consignments were disposed of by auction at losses as high
as 60 per cent. Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 138. As Llewellyn points out, the prerequisite for
factorage is the seller's need to ship to a market whose conditions on the arrival of his wares
are beyond his foresight. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 873,
884 (1939).
14 According to one estimate made in 1834, more than two-thirds of the entire trade of
Great Britain, both imports and exports, were handled by commission merchants. Lord Liverpool in the House of Lords, quoted by McCullock, A Dictionary, Practical Theoretical and
Historical of Commerce and Commercial Navigation, 571 (2d ed., 1834).
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England who, for a small percentage commission," would undertake the responsibility of shipping the goods abroad and selling them for him. 16 In either case,
however, the attendant risk of depreciation in the value of the goods always
17
remained with the manufacturer.
For the average manufacturer, the use of the commission merchant was clearly the more advantageous procedure. Not only were the trading connections
already established by the latter placed at his disposal, but the merchant's specialized knowledge of the market and the various techniques of shipping and insurance were also made available to him. Of even greater importance than these
services, however, were the credit facilities which the commission merchant
offered the manufacturer. Instead of having to wait for his money until the
goods were sold, a practice which only the strongest manufacturer could afford,18
he was permitted to draw on the factor for approximately two-thirds of the
estimated value of the consignment as soon as the goods were ready for shipment overseas. Once the bill of exchange was accepted by the commission merchant it became readily discountable in the money market, thereby enabling
the consignor to obtain control of funds despite the fact that his products were
as yet unsold. 9
By the early 1820's, it is clear that this method of dealing was predominant
in both the English import and export trade.20 Not only did this pattern of trading benefit the manufacturer and producer, but the attractiveness of the com16In 1801 the commission paid by manufacturers to their factors was 5 per cent of the
sale price of the goods. This included warehouse and del credere charges. The import factor
generally charged 2 or 21 per cent, depending upon the origin of the shipment. Buck, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 15; Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance 12 (1949). As
competition among Factors increased, especially in the cotton trade, these commissions were
reduced. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain 279 (1886).
16Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 122-29.
1 The risk was primarily one of depreciation in market price. The expansion of the services
of Lloyd's underwriters after 1793 enabled the owner to insure against the risk of loss in transit
to and from the remotest markets. Court, op. cit. supra note 5, at 79. The insurance was invariably effected by the factor, however.
18For example, manufacturers consigning their goods directly to the India market had to
wait about eighteen or nineteen months for receipt of the proceeds of sale. The voyage alone
took ten months. Parl. Papers, Report on Manufactures, 1833, 142.
19Parl. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 12. This system operated in exactly the same
manner for the overseas producer, except that he would generally consign his goods to a correspondent of a British commission house located in his own country, and obtain his advances
directly from him. The latter would forward the shipment on to the commission merchant in
England who would then undertake its disposal. Parl. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 7.
20 In its report of 1823, a select committee of Parliament states: "The growth of our commerce appears to have gradually led to greater extension of credit, and facilities in pecuniary
advances have increased in proportion as our trade generally has extended; and it is proved,
to the entire satisfaction of Your Committee... that the merchants of Great Britain are constantly in the habit of making advances on merchandize consigned to them for sale." Par.
Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 11.
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mission and the security for the credit advances gave the merchant even more
of an incentive to engage in this type of transaction than the consignor.21 Thus
not only was he always willing to accept the latter's consignments: in many
22
instances he actively sought them.
The factor's advantage in having a self-liquidating security always available
as protection for his advances was further increased by the ease and facility with
which this security could be handled. For many decades merchants had been
accustomed to dealing with bills of lading in lieu of goods, while the latter were
still at sea.23 In their hands it had achieved a flexibility which to some extent
rivalled that of another mercantile bill, the bill of exchange. 24 This practice of
dealing in goods by way of documents enabled the factor to recover his advances
long before the consignment itself arrived at the market of sale,25 and by so
doing gave him access to funds with which to finance further transactions of
this nature. Even more important than the speedy liquidation of debt was the
fact that such a device was susceptible to use beyond the immediate confines
of factor and consignor. Although generally speaking, the commission merchant
21

"Receiving consignments is the business we primarily wish for," said Joshua Bates in
1831, as manager of Baring Bros., one of the largest of the commission merchant houses. Hidy,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 105.
Advertisements, such as the following, which shows the American partners of the Liverpool
firm of Brown and Shipley canvassing for such shipments, were typical of this period: "Should
you send us cotton or other produce, we will either dispose of it in this market [i.e., the American], or re-ship it to our Liverpool house.... We are willing, at all times, to make reasonable
advances on property consigned to us, or our Liverpool house." Brown, A Hundred Years of
Merchant Banking, 190-91 (1909).
21 Parl. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 89. "Immediately after the peace of the country was consolidated, there were men issued out from Liverpool, calling themselves merchants,
going around from warehouse to warehouse, like number carriers, like hawkers of goods, and
requesting consignments; they said they were doing business with Rio Janeiro, and other ports
and they could as well sell £10,000 of goods along with theirs as not." Parliamentary Papers
(Great Britain), Report from the Select Committee on Petitions from the Hand-Loom Weavers, 10 Session 1834, 424, quoted by Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 127. The houses doing this
type of business became known as "slaughterhouses" because of the effect their underselling
had on the smaller manufacturers and upon trade in general. Ibid.
23 The earliest case at law mentioning the assignment of a bill of lading is Evans v. Marlett,
1 Ld. Raym. 271 (K.B., 1697). There appears to be abundant evidence, however, that the practice was widespread at a much earlier date. Consult 1 Select Pleas of the Court of Admiralty 44;
2 ibid., at 61, 63, 146 (Selden Society).
24The origin of the practice of assigning a bill of lading by indorsement and delivery is not
clear. From the opinion of Buller, J. in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.R. 63 (K.B., 1787), it would
appear that such a custom was well entrenched by 1787. And the remarks of the Privy Council
in Henderson v. The Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris, L.R. 5 P.C. 253 (1873), in which the
omission of the words "to order or assigns" on a bill of lading are discussed, suggest that the
bill had never been conceived of as anything but negotiable by those engaged in international
trade.

25 The initial impact of steam navigation only served to emphasize the difference between

mail and cargo arrivals. In the East Indian trade, for example, dispatches from London to Bombay during the late thirties averaged between six and nine weeks as against five months for the
cargo; while the Atlantic crossing was reduced from over fifty to less than fifteen days by the
mail packets operating in 1840. Porter, op. cit. supra note 8, at 539, 542.
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was, up to about 1850, the direct purveyor of credit to the exporting manufacturer and producer, he in turn was accustomed to receiving advances from a
bill broker, who often borrowed from the banker.2"
Originally this chain of credit was based wholly upon the security of the bill
of lading. In exchange for the advances, the commission merchant would transfer the document to the broker, who would pay the freight and other charges
incidental to the safe custody of the goods and once they were sold reimburse
himself from the proceeds. 27 Later, as transportation time diminished and new
so-called "documents of title,"2 such as the dock warrant and the wharfinger's
receipt emerged, 9 financing began to build up around these instruments also.30
The entire process is described as follows in the Parliamentary Report on Commercial Distress, 1848:
The Merchant... if he has not sufficient Capital [i.e. to meet his acceptances] has
to pledge that Produce (which he imports) with the Broker till
he has Time to sell
that Produce. Then a new Species of Bill is immediately drawn by the Merchant,..
26Parl. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 11, 17. The bill broker, or discount house, to
whom the consignor turned to discount his acceptances borrowed the surplus funds of the
banker in order to meet these demands also. The security of the banks was provided by the
bills themselves, which arising as they did from actual sales transactions were regarded as
A-1 paper.
2
7 Ibid., at 110, 113, 117; Evans, The City (or The Physiology of London Business) 177
(1845).
28Under the Factors Act of 1842, documents of title included "any Bill of Lading, India
Warrant, Dock Warrant, Warehouse Keeper's Certificate, Warrant, or Order for the Delivery
of Goods, or any other Document used on the ordinary Course of Business as Proof of the
Possession or Control of Goods, or authorising or purporting to authorise, either by Indorsement or by Delivery, the Possessor of such Document to transfer or receive Goods thereby
represented." Apart from the reference to the "India Warrant," which went out of use, this
definition was readopted by the codifying Act of 1889. 5 & 6 Vict., c. 39 § 4 (1842), as amended
52 & 53 Vict., c. 45, §4 (1889).
29Although the practice of dealing in these other documents in lieu of the goods existed before 1815, the attitude of the courts was equivocal as to whether the same effect should be
given to documents relating to goods on shore and those at sea. n Spear v. Travers, 4 Camp.
251, 253 (N.P., 1815), the special jury was of the opinion "that in practice, the indorsed dock
warrants and certificates are handed from seller to buyer as a complete transfer of the goods."
Parke, B., however, in Farina v. Home, 16 L.J. Ex. 73 (1846), adopted Blackburn's view that
the transfer of such documents did not operate per se as delivery of possession of the goods in
the same way as a bill of lading; but that a further act of attornment was necessary before
this was accomplished. Ibid., at 75. Blackburn, Sales 297 (1st ed., 1845). It was the latter view
that eventually prevailed. Today delivery orders and dock warrants are seldom used by trade
financiers as collateral because of this reason, save in those instances where the dock company
has obtained a private Act of Parliament making its dock warrants negotiable. Gutteridge and
Megrah, The Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits 133 n. (h) (1955).
30 This, despite the legal uncertainty concerning the use of these documents as collateral.
It is not without significance that Overend and Guemey, one of the largest discount houses
in the City of London, had willingly accepted these documents as security prior to its collapse
in 1866. Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), Report from the Select Committee on Bank
Acts, 1 Session 1857, 489-90 (evidence given by D. B. Chapman, managing partner in Overend and Guerney) (henceforth referred to as Parl. Papers, Report on Bank Acts, 1857);
Evan, Facts, Failures and Frauds: Revelations Financial, Mercantile, Criminal 179, 199, 701
(1856).
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upon the Broker on the Security ... lodged in the Warehouse... bonded or free.
Then it is the business of the Banker to ascertain from the Broker whether he has the
Produce and to what extent he has advanced upon it. It is his business to see that the
Broker has Property to protect himself if he make a loss. 31
It was, of course, the ease and safety which the documentary form of security
imparted to the financing operation which enabled the chain of credit to be
extended beyond the original participants in the consignment trade. The increasing awareness of the advantages of the system made the non-merchant
32
financier only too eager to advance his money on such security. Indeed, by the
1830's the acquisition of credit from these individuals had already become a
33
matter of merely endorsing over a bill of lading.
For the established commission merchant, this easy access to credit was not
an entirely unmixed blessing. Factors were actively competing with one another
in the late twenties to secure consignments; the willingness of the banker, broker
and discount house to advance on the documentary security only gave impetus
to this competition, since it enabled the commission merchant to increase his
own loans to the consignor as an added inducement for the latter's trade.
Advances during the thirties were thus considerably in excess of those offered
34
in the previous decade.
Another result of this ready availability of credit was that it added to the
speculative practices which were permeating English commercial life generally
during the period 1830-1850. 36 Numerous complaints were leveled by the older
and more experienced members of the merchant community against the indiscriminate lending practiced by the bankers, discount houses and brokers solely
on the basis of documentary collateral. Especially bitter were the attacks made
3
in connection with the East India trade, " where many abusive practices had
31Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), Report from the Secret Committee of the House
of Lords appointed to inquire into the Causes of Distress which has for some time prevailed
among the Commercial Classes, and how far it has been affected by the Laws for regulating the
Issue of Bank Notes payable on Demand, together with minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix,
24 Session 1847-1848, 283, quoted by Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 24; Parl. Papers, Report
on Merchants, 1823, 113.
22 Parliamentary Papers (Great Britain), Report from the Secret Committee of the House
of Commons on Commercial Distress, Session 1847-1848 (1st rep.) 73-74 (henceforth referred to as Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-1848 [1st rep.]).
33Ibid., at 55, 74.
34 By the 1840's it was over 90 per cent in some cases. Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial
Distress, 1847-1848 (2d rep.) 117.
35 The consignment trade itself was, of course, essentially speculative in nature. Par]. Papers, Report on Manufactures, 1833, 35-37, 127; Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 126.
3oThe East India Company was charged with unfair competition in using the bill of lading
as a means of remitting its annual balance of about three million pounds sterling to England.
This it did by the simple expedient of purchasing the documentary drafts (i.e., the bills of
exchange drawn on an English correspondent to which the bills of lading and other shipping
documents were attached) of merchants in India who were consigning goods to England. These
drafts were then sent to London, and the company had merely to await the arrival of the cargo
in Britain and the taking up of the bill of the exchange by the consignee. If the latter failed to

1957]

BILLS OF LADING AND FACTORS IN OVERSEAS TRADE

263

grown up as a result of this credit situation. A typical example was the habit
of many Calcutta merchants to purchase outgoing cargoes consigned to England, give a draft upon their correspondents in London as payment, and then
send the bill of lading home to England. Notwithstanding the fact that the bill
of lading traveling overland arrived in England within six weeks or so, the bill
of exchange was nevertheless drawn to mature only upon the arrival of the
cargo, some ten months after shipment. Thus, although the bill of exchange
arrived at the same time as the bill of lading and was then accepted by their
correspondent, it still had eight months to run after the time of its arrival in
England. By pledging the bill of lading with either a produce or discount
broker as security for advances, the correspondent had eight months free use of
37
the money before his acceptance matured.
The reason why the older commission merchants were so critical of those
who made advances solely on the basis of the documentary security to houses
indulging in practices of this nature was that no account was taken of the inherent financial instability which these trading methods indicated. As they saw
it, such houses were an extremely bad credit risk despite the existence of an
apparently iron-clad security. The indifference of these financiers to anything
beyond the immediate possession of the documentary collateral' s not only encouraged the continuation of the abuses themselves, it also effectively concealed
the true nature of the credit risk until it was too late, and the borrower went
completely bankrupt. 39
So long as such a liberal credit policy rested upon actual commercial transactions, however, the financial risks for the creditor were comparatively small.
It was when acceptances were granted without the acquisition of any security,
documentary or otherwise, that the lender exposed himself to very real peril.
The granting of open credits and accommodation bills 40 was not new, of course;
take up the draft, the bill of lading enabled the Company to obtain possession of the goods
and recover its outlay from the proceeds of sale.
This procedure naturally deprived the English commission merchant of a lucrative source
of profit, since instead of having to rely upon him for his funds, the consignor obtained them
directly from the East India Company, thereby giving the latter the benefit of the commission
on such advances. Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-1848 (2d rep.) 107-19;
Radford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade 1794-1858, 123-25 (1934).
37 Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-1848 (2d rep.) 118.
38 That this complacency was not entirely justified is shown by the famous Cole and
Davidson trade frauds of 1859 in which Overend and Guerney, the largest of the discount
houses, was somewhat discreditably involved. Seven years later, this particular firm crashed.
31Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-1848 (1st rep.) 14.
40 An open credit in international trade was one in which the remittance, either in the form
of produce or some other security, was not made contemporaneously with the acceptance. It
was granted solely on the basis of something to be done in the future before the acceptance matured. Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts, Session
1858, 114 (henceforth referred to as Parl. Papers, Report on Bank Acts, 1858). So long as they
were used cautiously, open credits were always recognized as an integral part of the credit system. It was the abuse that proved objectionable. Ibid., at 115-16.
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the old and established merchant houses had dealt for many years in credits
which had no identified security.4' Their issuance, however, had always depended upon the extremely high reputation of the person for whom the bills were
accepted. 42 With the tremendous competition in the overseas trade that arose
during this period, many of the commission merchants abandoned, or were
forced to abandon, their habitual caution in this respect. 43 The 1857 crisis was
44
a sharp reminder of the perils of such speculative practices.
Although the risk to creditors was comparatively small when the paper which
they held stemmed directly from an actual sales transaction, even amongst this
type of acceptance a considerable difference could exist as to soundness. Since
the bill was an order by one party to pay another a sum of money, generally at
a subsequent date, the ability of the party on whom the bill was drawn to meet
it at the appointed date was a factor of overwhelming importance. It was clear
to the merchants of the early nineteenth century (and this is just as true today)
that a bill accepted by a small tradesman had no value outside the confines of
his own locality. An acceptance of a great merchant house of unquestionable
standing, on the other hand, was an easily negotiable credit instrument, and
also an ideal form of investment for bankers and brokers who had to keep their
resources liquid. If cash were required immediately, it could be discounted at a
small charge; if not, the holder could await the date of maturity and then
collect from the acceptor.
Long before 1850, the larger commission houses were doing a thriving business in lending their credit to smaller factorage concerns. The practice whereby
the consignor drew his bill upon one of these larger houses instead of drawing it
4
Bankers were, thus, obviously reluctant to discount accommodation bills. Klein, The
Development of Mercantile Instruments of Credit, 12 J. of Acc. (N.Y.) 321, 604-5 (1911).
The danger of having no solid foundation on the issuance of a bill of exchange can be seen
by the following example. A grants B an open credit. B draws a bill on A for four months; A accepts it and then B discounts the acceptance. B then sends A another draft within four months,
also not drawn against a bill of lading. A accepts this draft also, and B again discounts it and
uses the proceeds to put A in funds in order to meet the just-matured acceptance. In 1857, sixteen houses in A's position collapsed. Par]. Papers, Report on Bank Acts, 1858, 119.
42 Hidy, op. cit. supra note 15, at 139, 297.
43
Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 156-58. It was in an attempt to overcome the hazards of
the open credit that Baring Bros. devised a receipt in the thirties by which all property purchased by means of the credit, together with "the proceeds thereof and the policies of insurance," were pledged and hypothecated with it as collateral security for repayment of the advance. This was, in effect, the forerunner of the modem trust receipt. Hidy, op. cit. supra note
15, at 142; see Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story 555 (C.C., 1843), where the legal effect of this receipt
was discussed. Compare the form of hypothecation agreement required by the East India
Company in its dealings. Parl. Papers, Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-1848 (2d rep.)
135-36.
44Commission merchants who endeavored to obtain some collateral for their speculative
activities often made advances to planter-consignors on the security of the latter's growing
crops. Especially during the feverish period of 1847-57, the not infrequent failure of the growers resulted in the merchants becoming planters, which, in turn, placed an additional financial
strain on their resources. A number of factorage concerns collapsed in 1857 as a result of this
type of operation. Parl. Papers. Report on Bank Acts. 1858. 112-13.

1957]

BILLS OF LADING AND FACTORS IN OVERSEAS TRADE

265

directly upon the consignee was known at the beginning of the century, but its
use did not become systematic until after 1800. 45 In essence, this type of financing did not differ from the credit services offered by the factor-consignee: the
pivot of both transactions still being the documentary security afforded by the
bill of lading. Instead of the consignor drawing directly on the factor, however,
and remitting both the draft and the shipping documents to him, he would
draw upon some large and well-established house designated by his consignee
46
and send the bill of exchange and shipping documents directly to that concern.
The latter would accept the bill and return it to the consignor, while retaining
47
the shipping documents for subsequent transference to the consignee.
This system of documentary credits, as it was called, began to gain prominence during the 1850's. Its widespread use reflected not only the growing
strength of the seller's position and the decline of the consignment method of
dealing which was manifesting itself about this time but the bifurcation of the
financing and trading function which was taking place within the mercantile
community. This division never really became clear-cut, however, until after
48
1860 when the consignment pattern had largely disappeared.
The disappearance of the consignment pattern was evident by 1850. Not only
was trading to order re-established in many of the foreign markets, 49 but new
patterns of dealing were also emerging.50 These developments, together with
the gradual stabilization of trade generally, made the disappearance of factorage as a large scale activity inevitable 5 ' For the commission merchant, the
alternative was either to revert to his former role as importer or exporter for his
4
6 Hidy, in his account of the growth of Baring Bros., shows how the firm's movement into
the acceptance business was accelerated after the turn of the century. Hidy, op. cit. supra note
15, at 15 and passim.
46 Ibid., at 136, 147. Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 155.
4
7 During the periods of intense speculation in the middle part of the century, the acceptance
house would retain the bill of lading until it received the amount of the acceptance plus interest and commission from the consignee. In some cases the latter would also be required to
deposit additional security in the form of 10 per cent of the estimated value of the goods. 65
Edinb. Rev. 220 (1837); Brown, A Hundred Years of Merchant Banking 250 (1909); Hidy,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 136-37; Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 156.
48 The introduction of telegraphic communication in 1837 and the successful laying of the
Continental and Atlantic cables in 1851 and 1866 were in themselves largely responsible for the
decline of the consignment trade. 2 Clapham, op. cit. supra note 2, at 315-17. As long as the
pattern persisted, the houses engaged in the acceptance business still continued the two operations: the 21 per cent commission on such sales being too safe and too lucrative a source of
profit to be abandoned easily.
49 Though in some of the more remote trades, such as those of the Black Sea and the Barbary Coast, the consignment pattern persisted for some time, as it did in certain commodities

such as wool. Ibid., at 317.

50 For example, dealing in arrivals and futures.
51 Ibid., at 316; Buck, op. cit. supra note 6, at 152. For an illuminating discussion of the
revival of factorage in the present century, consult Steffen and Danziger, The Rebirth of the
Commercial Factor, 36 Col. L. Rev. 745 (1936).
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own account, 2 or, if strong enough, to move directly and exclusively into the
field of buyer financing by means of the documentary credit. 3
It was from the latter movement of these one-time large factoring concerns
that the modern merchant banker emerged. Firms which originally had been
the dominant traders in one area or commodity now became the chief source of
finance in the same area. Though these "acceptance houses," as they came to
be called, did not limit their activities to particular commodities or countries,
each of them had its own special realm, both geographically and by com54
modity.
By the late 1860's it was clear that, if some of these houses were not as yet
fully matured banking institutions, all of them were nevertheless pre-eminent
in the field of foreign trade finance. Their knowledge of particular markets and
the reputation of those trading in them, which they had acquired as factors,
gave them a tremendous advantage over other purveyors of credit.55 It was this,
combined with the flexibility of the documentary system itself,56 that permitted
them to operate so easily and effectively, and enabled them to establish their
supremacy in this highly specialized area:57 a position which they have maintained ever since.
12Clapham,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 315.
In the Far Eastern trade, however, the commission merchants became industrial entrepreneurs giving rise to what Greenberg calls "the managing agency system." Greenberg,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 144.
4Truptil, British Banks and the London Money Market 132 (1936). For a history of these
various concerns, consult Ashley, The Story of the Banks 186-91 (1934).
55The English joint stock banks did not enter this field until the turn of the century.
Thackstone, The Methods of Financing Foreign Trade: The Part Played by the Banks 125,128;
Banking and Foreign Trade, Lectures Delivered at the Fifth International Banking Summer
School (1952).
56The acceptance credit was of great value in expanding the Far Eastern trade. The
British demand for Chinese goods during the nineteenth century was so much greater than the
latter's demands for British goods that the problem of payment became very real. Acceptances
drawn on such well-known houses as Baring and Co. and Jardine Matheson & Co. enabled
cargoes to be purchased without the need for shipping specie to such areas. Buck, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 158; Truptil, op. cit. supra note 54, at 132; Hidy, op. cit. supra note 15, at 74,
104, 113, 232. For the best account of trade in this area, however, consult Greenberg, op. cit.
supra note 2, at c. 1.
57 One of the important factors which influenced and stimulated the growth of these concerns in the nineteenth century was the misfortune which befell many of England's old time
trading rivals. Holland had been beaten in an unlucky war and had lost the greater part of her
Indian possessions, as well as a number of her vessels. Her financial prestige had been badly
shaken by the failure in 1796 of the 200-year-old Bank of Amsterdam. England, on the other
hand, had secured her position in the richest parts of India, while the port of London had made
gigantic strides and had become by the turn of the century the center of the entrep6t trade.
The wars of the French Republic had not only set back French trade, they had stimulated
English commerce and industry which, in turn, had given additional impetus to the multiplicity of demands for credits. In addition, the influx of merchants from Germany, Holland and
Denmark meant the establishment of houses in London which possessed both wealth and reputation of international standing. Truptil, op. cit. supra note 54, at 137 et seq.; Ashley, op. cit.
supra note 54, at 186-91; Withers and Palgrave, The English Banking System, reported in
Sen. Doc. No. 492, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. 53-54 (1910).
53
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II. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF TnE BILL OF LADING AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF CREDIT

The preceding description of the trade patterns of the nineteenth century
indicates that the development of the bill of lading by the merchant and banking community as the central pivot of international trade finance was accomplished with no great difficulty. For the lawyer, on the other hand, since in most
instances he was unfamiliar with commercial practice, the task of according
appropriate legal recognition to this development was not so easy. This is not
surprising when one considers that the structure of English life up to the latter
part of the eighteenth century was predominantly rural in nature. Land and
agriculture were the axes about which most of life revolved" and commerce
was so far removed from what were regarded as the normal activities of the
bulk of the population that it was not until 1690 that the courts gave effect to a
bill of exchange to which a non-merchant was a party.59
The conceptual nature of legal thinking during this period, geared, as it was,

to satisfying the requirements of an agricultural community rather than the
needs of a commercial and industrial society also added to these difficulties.
Much of the embarrassment which the courts were to experience when dealing
with bills of lading, and, indeed, most of those connected with overseas sales,
stemmed from their inability to see the concept of "property" as anything less
than a unitary whole.60 When "property" in goods was transferred by way of
indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading, the judiciary at this time had difficulty construing this as anything other than the transference of complete
6
ownership, regardless of the nature of the transaction. '
To distinguish between the use of the bill of lading as a security instrument
and as a trading device-that is, between a transfer of a limited interest in the
goods as collateral for an advance of credit, 2 and a transfer of the entire interest
pursuant to a contract of sale-compelled judges both to educate themselves in

56 Court, op.

cit. supra note 5, at c. 2.

11Witherley v. Sarsfield, 1 Show. 815 (Ex. Ch., 1690).
60 Consult Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1939). See also
Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns & Fowler [1923] 2 K.B. 490, and Chao v. British Traders Ltd. [1954],
1 All E. Rep. 779 (K.B.), for examples of the difficulties which this concept can cause.
61The ownership restrictions known in land law were extremely difficult to analogize successfully with chattels, although by the eighteenth century most mortgage transactions were
coming before the courts of equity. The old common law mortgages would probably not have
helped to illuminate the situation because, as Plucknett points out, they "suffered from the incurable defect that they employed formulas which contradicted the true nature of the operation-they spoke of feoffments in fee, and leases for years, when the transaction was really
neither-and such forms inevitably attracted several doctrines of seisin and the derivation of
estates, which tended to defeat their purpose." Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common
Law 573 (4th ed., 1948).
62The bill of lading could also be used as a means of securing the payment of the purchase
price by the buyer. See Meyer v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 74 (C.P., 1813); Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, 3 Ex. D. 164 (1878).
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the ways of the commercial world and also to readjust their modes of thought
to meet the demands of this new economic order. For most of them, the process
was as slow as it was painful.
The earliest reference to the legal effect of the transfer of a bill of lading,
according to Lord Tenterden in his classical work on the Law of Shipping," was
the decision of Evans v. Martleti in 1697.4 There the opinion was expressed by
Chief Justice Holt that the consignee of a bill of lading had sufficient "property"
in the goods to assign 5 the document to a third party. 6Just what was meant by
"property," however, is not clear since the report itself gives very few details
as to the facts of the case.
Probably the first occasion in which the question of assignability and its
effect actually came directly before a law court was Snee V. Prescott'V in 1743.
This was an action by the assignees in bankruptcy of a consignee, T, to recover
from the London agent of the consignors certain silks which the latter had
shipped to T. It appeared that the consignor, R (T's partner in Italy), had
obtained certain silks for T's account and in so doing had advanced money on
T's behalf. The bill of lading for the silks was made out to R's order, indorsed
by him in blank, and sent to T. T assigned it to B as security for advances.
After the goods were shipped T went bankrupt, but on their arrival R's agent
presented a copy of the bill of lading to the ship's master and managed to obtain
63Abbot, Law of Shipping 844 (14th ed., 1901).
641 Ld. Raym. 271, 3 Salk 290 (KYB., 1697). Although this is probably the earliest pronouncement at common law (Shower refers to another case decided in Exchequer Chamber,
but it is not reported; Abbot, op. cit. supra note 63, at 844.), there is little doubt that it was
used as a trading device long before 1697. As early as 1538, in the case of "The Thomas," a
copy of a bill of lading is to be found preserved on the records of the Court of Admiralty. 1 Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty 61 (1538) (Selden Society). And in 1554, another Admiralty decision reproduces a bill of lading in which the master of a ship is to deliver "into a certain
merchant, his factor [i.e. agent] or assigns the aforesaid XV ton and ij pouchions of wine,
etc." Ibid.
Although in none of these cases are the effects of the assignment of the bill of lading mentioned specifically, there are records of other decisions in the old Admiralty Courts in which
the practice among merchants of transferring rights in goods by delivery of the bill of lading
is indicated. In Flute's case, for instance, one finds a ship master being sued in Admiralty for
delivering a bar of silver to a person who had fraudulently obtained the bill of lading. Ibid. To
what extent and with what effect the practice of indorsing the document had also grown up in
this early period is not clear, however. But the fact that the eighteenth-century reports speak
of indorsement of bills of lading as being a well established custom would seem to indicate that
it did have considerable significance even at that time. For an introduction to the early history
of bills of lading generally, as well as to their assignability, consult Bennett, The H-istory and
Present Position of the Bill of Lading as a Document of Title for Goods (1914).
65 It was only with the passing of the Bill of Lading Act in 1855 (18 & 19 Vict., c. 111) that
the bill of lading became fully negotiable. Prior to that time the holder of such a document,
even though he had acquired the full legal and equitable property in the goods, could not bring
an action on the contract in his own name unless he was an original party to the agreement. See
Sewell v. Burdick, 10 App.Cas. 74 (1884).
661 Ld. Raym. 271 (K.B., 1697). The report in Salkild, however, does not contain this dictum. 3 Salk. 290 (K.B., 1697).
671 Atk. 245 (Ch., 1743).
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delivery of the cargo. The plaintiffs claimed that although the bill of lading had
been made to the order of R, since it had been indorsed by them in blank and
sent to T "the instant the goods were loaded on board ...[the vessel], the
property vested in T."18
Despite finding for the defendant on the grounds that his regaining possession
of the goods entitled him to have his lien satisfied out of the proceeds of sale,
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's attitude toward the assignment of the bill of
lading is more than a little ambiguous. While explicitly denying that the blank
indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading passed any interest in the goods
themselves as between consignor and consignee, he still acknowledged the
transaction between T and B by providing that any proceeds remaining after
R's advances had been repaid should be used to satisfy B's loan.6"
Although Snee v. Prescott confronted the courts with the dual mercantile
function of the transfer of the bill of lading, it was not until the great case of
Lickbarrow v. Mason0 that they were called upon to fix the different types of
legal interests that could be carved out by the negotiation of the document.
Some indication of the difficulties which this task posed for the judiciary can
be gathered from the fact that Lickbarrow v.Mason was argued for more than
71
six years, going from the King's Bench to the House of Lords and back again.
6,Ibid., at 246.

69 The reasons for so doing, however, are not made clear. It is interesting to note that despite Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's statement about the effect of the indorsement and delivery
of the bill of lading, from the arguments of plaintiff's counsel in the case it appears the assignees
of the bill of lading were in no doubt that they had some interest in the goods as apparently
they had insured it. According to counsel, it was "the custom of merchants to borrow money
upon bills of lading which had been looked upon as good security." Ibid., at 246 et seq.
7 2 T.R. 63 (K.B., 1787), rev'd 1 H.BI. 357 (Ex.Ch., 1790), rev'd and venire de novo ordered, 5 T.R. 367 (H.L., 1793). The various reports of the case, together with Justice Buller's
opinion, are all reproduced in 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703 et seq. (13th ed., 1929), to which
all future case references will be made.
71
During the course of the protracted litigation of Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703 (13th ed., 1929), another situation arose in Solomons v. Nissen, 2 T.R. 674 (K.B.,
1788), which would have permitted the court to have carved out these interests had it been
so inclined. It appeared that H had purchased a quantity of pig lead from the defendant who
sent H the bill of lading indorsed in blank. The plaintiff made advances to H in the form of
acceptances, and in return H indorsed the bill of lading over to him. Very shortly after this,
the plaintiff and H became "partners" in an agreement to sell the cargo on arrival and share
the profits together. However, it appears that the partnership existed at the time when the
advances were made. H subsequently became bankrupt, and the defendants, as unpaid vendors, stopped the goods in transitu. The plaintiff's action was in trover.
The court's decision in Solomons v. Nissen is extremely interesting because of the ambiguity
of its approach to the bill of lading as a security and trading device. Apparently it was prepared to recognize the practice of assigning the bill of lading and of accomplishing such an assignment by indorsement and delivery of the document. It was also apparently aware that
competing interests in the goods could arise and that it was essential that the assignee dealt
with the bill of lading in good faith. Yet, notwithstanding this, and in spite of what appeared
to be obvious fraud on the plaintiff's part, the court, in finding quite rightly for the defendant,
chose to base its decision upon reasons that made it obvious that its understanding of mercantile matters was far from perfect. By denying the plaintiff's action on the grounds that at
the time of indorsement he was aware that the goods were not paid for, the court set a prece-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

The action, one in trover, arose on the following facts: Turing and Sons, merchants in Holland, shipped the goods in question for Liverpool by the order
and on the account of Freeman of Rotterdam. The ship's master signed a set
of four bills of lading for the goods in the usual form, "unto the order or assigns."
Two parts were indorsed in blank by Turing and Sons and sent by them together with the invoice to Freeman on the 22d of July, 1786. The third and
fourth parts of the set were retained by Turing and Sons, and the captain,
respectively. Three days later Turing and Sons drew a bill upon Freeman for the
price of the goods, which he accepted. Subsequently, in order to have the
plaintiff, a Liverpool merchant, take possession of the goods and sell them
for his account, Freeman sent the 'plaintiff the two bills of lading and the
invoice, both documents being in the same state as he had received them originally from Turing and Sons. At the same time, Freeman drew upon the plaintiff,
who subsequently accepted the drafts and duly honored them. Freeman became
bankrupt before the bills of exchange drawn by Turing and Sons on him became
due, and consequently the latter, as drawers, were obliged to take up and pay
them. On hearing of Freeman's bankruptcy, however, Turing and Sons indorsed
the bill of lading in their possession to the defendants and transmitted it to them
together with the invoice, authorizing them to obtain possession of the goods on
their behalf. This the defendants did on the arrival of the ship at Liverpool, and
they later sold the goods for their principals. The plaintiff, as creditor of Freeman for the amount of the draft, demanded the goods of the defendants and
tendered to them the freight and charges; plaintiff did not offer the purchase
72
price, which remained unpaid.
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, but was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber. On appeal, the House of Lords reversed the Exchequer
Chamber and ordered a new trial. To understand fully the exact nature of the
problems confronting the court in this case, it is necessary to follow carefully
the particular sales patterns which were involved. Although the pronouncements of Justice Buller were to be regarded as the great authority on this subject for nearly a hundred years, an analysis of the actual transaction reveals
clearly that his statements were too broad; and that his attempt to fix the
interests passed by assignment of the bill of lading only served to confuse subsequent judges as to the true mercantile significance of such assignments.7 3
In the first place, the evidence seemed to show that the relationship between
dent which, had it been allowed to remain law, would have completely wrecked the flexibility
and adaptability of the bill of lading as an integral part of the credit mechanism. As it was,
almost twenty years had to pass before Lord Ellenborough distinguished the case out of existence in Cuming v. Brown, 9 East 506 (K.B., 1808).
The full trial history of the case is contained in 6 East 20(n) (1805), which includes the
very elaborate opinion which Justice Buller delivered before the House of Lords in 1793, and
also the statement by the special jury concerning the custom of merchants as regards bills of
lading and the passing of property.
73 See Sewell v. Burdick, 10 App. Cas. 74, 98 (1884).
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Turing and Sons and Freeman was that of seller and buyer. The indorsement in
blank and delivery of the bill of lading by the seller, if it passed the whole interest in the goods, passed it as a result of and in keeping with the underlying contract between the parties. Between Freeman and the plaintiff, however, the
relationship was not that of seller and buyer, but that of consignor and consignee. The transaction was patently not one which involved trading to order.
Freeman's instructions to the Liverpool merchant were to sell the goods on his
account; that is, to act as a factor for him. Justice Buller in his opinion before
the House of Lords, however, stated that as these words were not to be found
in the bill of lading itself they could not alter the nature and construction of the
document, and even if the plaintiff was considered a factor it would not make
any difference. His words on this subject are revealing:
Supposing that the plaintiffs are to be considered as factors, yet if a bill of lading, as
I shall contend presently passes the legal property in the goods, the circumstance of
the plaintiffs being liable to render an account to Freeman for these goods afterwards
will not put Turing in a better condition in this case; for a factor has not only a right
to keep goods till he is paid all that he has advanced or expended on account of the
74
particular goods but also till he is paid the balance of his general account.
The import of these words was apparently that the bill of lading possessed an
inherent power to pass the entire legal interest in the goods, and that the
underlying contract from which it stemmed was ineffective to prevent this complete transfer, even as between the contracting parties themselves, unless a
limitation appeared on the face of the bill itself.
By adopting such a position, justice Buller prevented himself from achieving
the delicate balance required by the demands of trade and finance. Although
he saw quite correctly that financing by a factor made the latter's interest in the
goods different from that of an ordinary agent, he did not see that it also made
it different from that of an ordinary purchaser. The difference, as has been seen,
was that the goods were regarded by the factor primarily as security for money
advanced; that the factor normally derived his profit from interest and commission and not from re-sale; and that his interest in the goods was not that of a
manufacturing-purchaser or a wholesaling-purchaser which could only be satisfied by full ownership, but essentially that of a creditor. 75 To satisfy this security
interest did not require that the factor should become owner of the goods (and
thereby become no different from an ordinary purchaser), 76 but only that, in
the event of bankruptcy, his interest should have priority over all others to the
extent of his advances.
74 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703, 733 (13th ed., 1929).
75 This applied equally, of course, to third party financing of the factor himself. Again, all
that these third parties required was a secured interest in the goods and not the full ownership
itself.
7
6It was, of course, to avoid the risks of this position that the merchant undertook his factorage operations in the speculative periods of the nineteenth century. Consult discussion at
258 supra.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

In reviewing the authorities, Justice Buller missed his own vital distinction
from the earlier decision of Hibbert v. Carter,7 7 in which he had concluded, quite
correctly, that it was the intent of the parties which determined the disposition
of the "property" in the goods. The fallacy in choosing in all cases to divorce
the effect of the indorsement of the bill of lading from the underlying contract
can be seen by the internal inconsistencies in Buller's opinion in the Lickbarrow
case.78 The difficulties created by the adoption of this position, however, only
became apparent as the bill of lading began to be used with increasing frequency
79
as an instrument of credit.
771 T.R. 745 (K.B., 1787). This was an action brought upon a policy of insurance, on goods
which were lost on a voyage. The plaintiffs, merchants in London, procured the insurance for
a cargo consigned to them from Jamaica. Prior to the date when the insurance was effected,
the bill of lading was assigned to a third party as security for advances made to the consignors.
In defending the action the underwriters contended that at the time the plaintiffs had effected
the insurance the bill of lading had already been assigned, and that as this served to pass the
entire property the plaintiffs had no interest left to insure. The plaintiffs argued that since the
transfer of the bill of lading was merely for collateral security, the indorsement did not transfer
the entire property in the goods. Finding for the plaintiffs, Justice Buller expressed the opinion
that although an indorsement of a bill of lading purported upon its face to transfer the entire
property in the goods, this was a presumption subject to the evident intention of the parties
and there was nothing to prevent them from coming to a different arrangement. This of course
recognized clearly that the assignment of a bill of lading could be the result of either a trading
(i.e., sales) transaction or a financing arrangement.
78 In Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wins. 185, 186 (Ch., 1733), Lord Chancellor King had stated:
"When a merchant beyond sea consigns goods to a merchant in London, on account of the
latter, and draws bills on him for such goods; though the money is not paid, yet the property of
the goods vests in the merchant in London, who is credited for them, and consequently they
are liable to his debts. But where a merchant beyond sea consigns goods to a factor in London,
who receives them, the factor in this case being only a servant or agent for the merchant beyond
sea can have no property in such goods... ; neither will they be affected by his bankruptcy."
Justice Buller, when adverting to this dictum in his opinion, said: "The next point there
stated (i.e., in Godfrey v. Furzo) is, what is the law of a pure factor without any demand of
his own? Lord King says he would have no property. This expression is used as between consignor and consignee, and obviously means no more than that, in the case put, the consignor
may reclaim the property from the consignee. The reason given by Lord King is, because in
this case the factor is only a servant or agent for the merchant beyond sea. I agree, if he be
merely a servant or an agent, that part of the case is also good law, and the principal may retain the property. But then it remains to be proved that a man who is in advance, or under acceptances on account of the goods, is simply and merely a servant or agent; for which no authority has been, or as I believe can be produced." Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Smith's Leading
Cases 703, 736 (13th ed., 1929).
For Justice Buller to maintain this position, however, obviously necessitated going behind
the actual transfer of the bill of lading and examining the relationship between the shipper and
the receiver of the goods; an action which was clearly inconsistent with his view that an assignment of a bill of lading ipsofacto passed the entire property in the goods.
71One of the indications of the unsatisfactory nature of the decision of Lickbarrow v. Mason, I Smith's Leading Cases 703 (13th ed., 1929), was the frequency with which litigation
concerning the bill of lading occurred during the nineteenth century. Apparently only the
judges could acclaim the propriety and authority of Justice Buller's opinion with any degree of
enthusiasm. Notwithstanding its obvious dissatisfaction, however, the mercantile community
was destined to live with the ruling for almost a hundred years until in Sewell v. Burdick, 10
App. Cas. 74 (1884), the House of Lords finally gave expression to the necessary refinements of
Justice Buller's judgment.
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Haille v. Smith, which occurred nine years later, showed dearly that such a
position could produce obviously incongruous results. 81 In that case the plaintiffs, a firm of merchant-bankers, brought an action in trover against the captain of a ship to recover the value of a cargo of hemp and iron. V, a firm of merchants in Liverpool, wishing to draw upon the plaintiffs' banking house in London had agreed, inter alia, to consign goods as security to the merchant house
of S and A which was made up of the same partners as the banking establishment. V accordingly remitted an invoice of a cargo, together with the bill of
lading indorsed in blank to S and A, but the cargo, although loaded on board
the ship, was prevented from leaving Liverpool because of an embargo. V, now
heavily indebted to the plaintiff, became bankrupt and the cargo was delivered
to the assignee in bankruptcy by the ship's captain against whom the action
was brought.
The plaintiffs argued that the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading
transferred the entire property to them, and, therefore, that the goods were
rightfully theirs. For the defense, it was pointed out that the goods were
only consigned as collateral security, and the risk and charges attendant on
them were still with the consignor. It was argued that this, plus possession, gave
the consignor the right to retain the goods, so that the defendant was justified
in making delivery to the assignee in bankruptcy.
The arguments of the litigants dearly revealed one of the dilemmas created
by Justice Buller's earlier opinion. The transaction specifically stated that the
shipment of the cargo was for collateral only. To hold, therefore, that there had
been a transfer of full ownership meant interpreting the transaction as something which was completely different from that which it was intended to be.
Furthermore, such a holding would involve refuting the defendant's contention
that the risk and charges attendant on the goods were still with the consignor,
a proposition which of itself appeared to be irrefutable. On the other hand, the
bill of lading had been indorsed in blank and delivered, and that, according to
Lickbarrow v. Mason, was sufficient to pass the entire property. Chief Justice
Eyre's resolution of this difficulty was unsatisfactory, but understandably so.
In upholding the plaintiffs' action, he chose to follow Justice Buller's statement
of the law, but circumvented its most obvious objection by introducing a trust
concept as a smoke screen:82
801 Bos. and P. 563 (Ex. Ch., 1796).
81
lHibbert v. Carter, 1 T.R. 745 (K.B., 1787) (discussed at note 77 supra), had already
indicated some of the incongruities that could follow if everyone dealing with the bill of lading
were regarded as a purchaser.
82 The question of who would have been liable to the beneficiary bank for its advances had
the goods been destroyed in transit after the merchant house of S and A had received the bill
of lading would have been an interesting one. Presumably, from the Chief Justice's statement,
it would have been S and A, as trustees. It is difficult, although not entirely impossible, to
imagine a court arriving at this decision. If the courts were not ready to adapt their concept of
"property" to satisfy and give effect to the varying financial interests which the mercantile
community was carving out of one chattel and one cargo, interests which to the legal mind
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The case is now brought to point in this one short proposition, viz. That the property
was transferred to Smiths and Atkinson [the merchant house] upon a trust in which
those who transferred the property, and the banking-house were concerned. If this can
be maintained, all the objections which occur so forcibly upon the notion of a bargain
and sale, will be removed. s s
The Haille case indicated the dificulties inherent in the Lickbarrow decision.
Did the financier who was interested in the goods merely as security want the
entire risk of loss that passed with the property? Was the original vendor, if
unpaid in full, left with nothing but a claim for money against the factor, if the
latter had used the bill of lading to raise capital? Was the factor required every
time he wished to obtain funds to sell his inventory regardless of market prices?
And, if freight charges were outstanding, who was to pay-the owner, the
financier?
A makeshift device such as that employed by Chief Justice Eyre could not
continuously be applied to all the problems arising out of bill of lading transactions. Justice Buller had given great impetus to the use of the bill of lading as a
trading device, but he had accomplished this at the expense of the other function of the document. A counterbalance was needed, and, in 1833, equity indi84
tihe Matterof Westzinthus
cated a method whereby this could be achieved. In
the vendor of goods was claiming the proceeds of the sale of a cargo of oil. The
facts of the case were before the Court upon the award of an arbitrator. It
appeared that Westzinthus shipped to order a cargo of oil to Lapage and Company, a firm of merchants in Liverpool. The bill of lading, together with a bill of
exchange, was transmitted to Westzinthus's agent in England with instructions
to deliver the bill of lading to Lapage and Company if, and when, they accepted
the bill of exchange. This was done. Hardman and Company, who were in the
habit of making advances (by cash and acceptances) on goods placed in their
hands by Lapage and Company, in consideration for the assignment of Westzinthus's bill of lading and as a further advance for goods already in their possession,
accepted a number of drafts drawn by Lapage and Company. Some time after
must have appeared to be only tenuously connected to its monolithic category of "property,"
and, therefore, very easily separated from it; it was hardly likely that they would divorce the
idea of risk of loss of the goods from the "property" in them. After all, if no goods were in
existence how could one have "property" in them? Yet there were other decisions in the field
of marine insurance which revealed quite clearly that merchants all thought in terms of risk
and of insuring those risks.
The introduction of the trust idea should, of course, have been unnecessary, but Lickbarrow
v. Mason, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703 (13th ed., 1929), was far too imposing an authority to
ignore. In fairness to Chief Justice Eyre, however, it should be noted that he recognized the
limited value of his methods and took pains to limit the decision to the facts of the particular
case.
81 Haille v. Smith, 1 Bos. and P. 563, 569 (Ex. Ch., 1796). It is obvious, however, that this
was no answer to the defendant's contention. For further examples of this same type of difficulty resulting from the initial failure to distinguish the dual purpose of the bill of lading, examine Meyer v. Sharpe, 5 Taunt. 74 (C.P., 1813); Lucas v. Dorrian, 7 Taunt. 278 (C.P.:
1817).
84 5 B. & A. 817 (K.B., 1833).
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these transactions had occurred, Lapage and Company became bankrupt and
the acceptance held by Westzinthus was dishonored. The latter then served
notice on the master of the ship that he claimed the right to stop in transit.
Hardman and Company, however, managed to obtain possession of the goods.
At the time of the bankruptcy, Lapage and Company owed Hardman and Company £9,271 on account of advances, as security for which the latter held, besides the bill of lading, Lapage's goods to the value of £9,961.
The court held that Westzinthus had a right to insist upon the proceeds of
Lapage's other goods being first appropriated to the discharge of Hardman's
lien and, as they proved sufficient to satisfy it, he had a right to receive the
entire proceeds that the sale of the oil would realize. Lord Denman's reasoning
in reaching this conclusion merits very close examination as it marks the first
inroad on the Lickbarrow doctrine. In the course of his opinion, Lord Denman
pointed out:
As Westzinthus would have had a dear right at law to resume the possession of the
goods on the insolvency of the vendee,"' had it not been for the transfer of the property
and right of possession by the indorsement of the bill of lading for a valuable consideration, to Hardman, it appeared to us in a court of equity, such transfer would be treated
as a pledge or mortgage only, in analogy to the common case of a mortgage of a real
estate, which is considered as a mere security, and the mortgagor as the owner of the
land. We therefore think that Westzinthus, by his attempted stoppage in transitu,
acquired a right to the goods in equity (subject to Hardman's lien thereon) as against
Lapage and his assignees, who are bound by the same equities that Lapage himself was.
And this view... agrees with the opinion of Mr. Justice Buller, in his comment on
the case of Snee v. Prescott and Lickbarrow v. Mason. 86 If, then, Westzinthus had an
equitable right to the oil, subject to Hardman's lien thereon for his debt, he would, by
means of his goods, have become a surety to Hardman for Lapage's debt, and would
then have a dear equity to oblige Hardman to have recourse against Lapage's own
goods, deposited with him, to pay his debt in ease of the surety; and all the goods,
both of Lapage and Westzinthus, having been sold, he would have a right to insist
upon the proceeds of Lapage's goods being appropriated, in the first instance, for the
87
payment of the debt.
81Presumably on the basis of a right of stoppage in transitit. See the judgment of Lord
Abinger in Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W. 321, 336 (Ex., 1841), for the history and nature
of this right.
86It is difficult to see how Lord Denman arrived at this conclusion. In the first place the
consignor, in Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245 (Ch., 1743), regained and was in possession of the
goods at the time of the action. In the second place the action was between the assignees in
bankruptcy of the consignee and the agent of the consignor; and in the third place, although
the "pawnee" (who was in Hardman's position) was given preference, the reasons for this
were never discussed. Justice Buller's comments on this were "that whatever might be the
law, the mere fact of a consignor being in possession was a sufficient reason for a court of equity
to say 'We will not take possession from you till you have been paid what is due to you for the
goods'." He then goes on to say, "It is apparent that whatever might be the law of the case, in
a most elaborate opinion, Lord Hardwicke decided on the equity alone, arising out of the particular circumstances of it, ithout meaning to set the principles of law on which the present
case depends." 1 Smith's Leading Cases 740-41 (13th ed., 1929).
87In the Matter of Westzinthus, 5 B. & A. 817, 834 (K.B., 1833).
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Thus, Lord Denman, having first accorded due recognition to the legal effect
of the transfer of the bill of lading, proceeded to introduce the idea of an equitable mortgage where such a transfer was made to raise credit only. By so doing,
he not only recognized that the transfer of the document was something entirely
different from a purchase or sale, but, by analogizing it to a mortgage of real
estate, he managed to give it an effect more in keeping with the intention of the
parties. Admittedly, it was a cumbersome analogy and the confusion of the
concepts of "property" and the "right of possession" was still somewhat bewildering.88 Yet, as a gloss on Lickbarrowv. Mason, it was undoubtedly of major
importance in enabling the courts, especially of equity, to approach future problems of this type in a realistic manner. A court of equity could at once recognize
the Lickbarrow doctrine and at the same time ignore its deleterious effects. Thus
it could focus attention upon the real nature of the transaction and, in so doing,
work out the rights and obligations of the various types of holders more accurately and more fairly.
The mercantile community did not overlook the significance of this gloss. In
Spalding v. Ruding, s9 the question of priorities between the plaintiff-vendors
and the third-party creditor-indorsees of the bill of lading was again argued
before a court of equity. S, acting as the plaintiffs' agent, had sold the cargo to
W, who at the time of receiving the bill of lading accepted certain bills of exchange drawn on him by the plaintiffs. W later pledged the bill of lading to the
defendants as security for an advance. Subsequently W became bankrupt and
the acceptances held by S for the plaintiffs were dishonored. S refused to allow
the master of the ship to part with the cargo, but on being informed that the
defendants possessed an indorsed bill of lading, they allowed them to obtain it
without prejudice to his claim for the proceeds.
The defendants maintained that they were entitled to the entire proceeds of
the sale in satisfaction of the general account existing between themselves and
the bankrupt. The court, however, refused to recognize this contention. It held
that, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants had good title in law, the
transfer of the goods was for a limited purpose and did not completely destroy
the right of stoppage in transitu.1 By again recognizing that such a transfer of
the bill of lading could be for a limited purpose and in furtherance of something
other than a contract of sale, equity clearly marked the way by which the difficulties of the Lickbarrow doctrine could be overcome. 91
8

s Lord Denman's recognition of the transfer of the bill of lading as a security was very
helpful; his analogy of the mortgage involving the additional concept of "right of possession"
was less fortunate. Luckily the court did not at that time trouble themselves with the unnecessary problem of deciding whether such transaction was in fact a mortgage or a pledge. See
Sewell v. Burdick, 10 App.Cas. 74 (1884) (discussed at 278-81 infra).
896 Beav. 376 (Ch., 1843).
90 The court relied on In the Matter of Westzinthus, 5 B. & A. 817 (K.B., 1833), even
though in this case a marshalling of assets was not possible.
11It should be remembered that the notion of a limited transfer was not new to the law.
Hibbert v. Carter, 1 T.R. 745 (K.B., 1787). In this particular case, equity's achievement lay
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The willingness of the common law to adopt this counterbalance was made
apparent six years later in Jenkyns v. Brown.9 2 Using his own money, the
plaintiff's agent, K, had purchased a quantity of corn for his principal. He then
drew upon the plaintiff for the purchase price, using a bill of exchange which
expressly recited that it was drawn on account of the corn. K sold the bill to
the defendant, giving him at the same time the indorsed bill of lading to K's
order with instructions that if the bill of exchange was not honored by the plaintiff the defendant was at liberty to sell the goods. The plaintiff accepted the
bill of exchange, but failed to honor it and the defendant thereupon sold the
corn. In an action in trover, the Queen's Bench refused to disturb the verdict
given in favor of the defendant, pointing out:
By delivering this bill of lading, indorsed to the defendant, as a security for the payment of the bills of exchange drawn on the plaintiff for the value of the cargo, and
giving power to sell in case of failure of payment (the bills of exchange having been
purchased by the defendant), they passed to the defendant for value a special property
in the cargo; and by afterwards sending the invoice with the bills of exchange and
letters of advice to the plaintiff they passed to him the general property in the cargo
subject to the special property.93
The merchant financier's possession of the bill of lading, correctly regarded
by equity as being for a "limited purpose, '9 4 was thus recognized by the common law as giving the possessor a "special property"95 in the goods represented
by the document. Although the Queen's Bench could not escape completely the
entanglements of the "property" concept, it was becoming aware of the necessity for refining it in order to achieve maximum flexibility in furthering the aims
of commerce. As was to be expected, this awakening consciousness was a slow
and painful process. Not all judges, even at this stage, realized the need for
these changes; not all of them understood the requirements and mechanisms of
trade and finance. Some members of the bench, with the best of intentions, still
6
obfuscated the issues by over-generalization and woolly conceptualization.Y
Others, however, more cognizant and more familiar with commercial needs
were quicker to perceive the necessity of abandoning this rigid thinking if the
law was to accomplish anything. Thus one finds justice Blackburn, in the case
of Calcuttaand Burmal Steam Navigation Company v. DeMattos,9" scrupulously
avoiding any mention of the word "property" when discussing the security
function of the bill of lading:
not so much in fulfilling, as in reminding the common law that there had been decisions regarding bills of lading before Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703 (13th ed., 1929).
- 14 A. & E. 496 (Q.B., 1849).
9
3 Ibid., at 502-3, per Justice Coleridge.
9
,Spalding v. Ruding, 6 Beav. 376 (Ch., 1843).
' 5 See also Turner v. Trustees of the Liverpool Dock, 6 Ex. 543 (Ex. Ch., 1851).
9 E.g., Short v. Simpson, L.R. 1 C.P. 248, 250 (1866); Chartered Bank of India, Australia,
and China v. Henderson, L.R. 5 P.C. 501-2 (1874); The Emilien Marie, 44 L.J. Adm. 9 (1875).
97 32 LJ.Q.B. 322 (1863).
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The bill of lading is handed to them so as to give them the actual, defacto, dominion
over the goods, and to confer upon them the power of giving to a third party, by a
sale or pledge of that bill, what that third person would believe to be a rightful dominion over the goods. This, too, is consistent with the bill of lading being delivered to the
company merely with a view to give them an effectual security for an advance.9 8
Notwithstanding this progress, the question of what interest actually passed
by delivery of an indorsed bill of lading still troubled many judges. To most of
the judiciary Lickbarrow v.Mason was still the cornerstone of their thinking as
regards the bill of lading, and while they recognized the necessity of refining
its overstatement when the transfer of the document was not made in pursuance
of a sale, they still believed this could be accomplished without weakening the
basic common law proposition as put forth by Justice Buller. By adopting
equity's position that such a transfer amounted to a mortgage99 of the goods,
many courts were able to maintain the accepted conceptual status quo in law
and allow the "property" to pass by indorsement and delivery, but protect the
indorser-debtor (and those claiming under him) by permitting him to retain an
equity of redemption.100
Other members of the bench thought it wiser wherever possible to give effect
to the transaction without categorizing the transfer as either a mortgage or a
pledge. In Kempt v. Falk,1°1 for example, Lord Blackburn, while stressing the underlying transaction, took great pains to avoid placing it in either category. The
deliberate ambiguity of this approach, reflecting an obvious dissatisfaction with
Lickbarrow v. Mason, could not be maintained indefinitely. And, in Sewell v. Burdick,'1 2 it had to be abandoned at least partially. In that case the courts were
confronted with a choice of either accepting the pronouncement of justice
Buller as regards the passing of the "property" or else drastically limiting it.
The issue presented was whether the indorsee of a bill of lading taken as
98
Ibid., at 329. Compare the remarks of Lord Selbourne in City Bank v. Barrow, 5 App. Cas.
664, 670 (1880).
99First suggested, however, only as an analogy: In Re Westzinthus, 5 B. & A. 817 (K.B.,
1833).
100This view was adopted in some instances both by law and equity as being the actual
effect of such a transfer. E.g., McNee v. Gorst, L.R. 4 Eq. 315 (Ch., 1867); Pigott v. Pigott, L.R.
4 Eq. 549 (Ch., 1867); Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris, 38 L.J.P.C. 30 (1869). See
particularly the opinion of Lord Justice Brettin Glyn v. East and West India Dock Co., 6 Q.B.
475 (C.A., 1880). But see Meyerstein v. Barber, L.R. 2 C.P. 38 (1866), where Justice Willes
classifies such a transfer as a pledge. Conceptually, however, this last case is riddled with confused dicta. For example, Justice Willes's statements as to the holding of In Re Westzinthus,
5 B. & A. 817 (K.B., 1833), conflicts with his view that the transfer of the bill of lading is a
pledge. Lords Hatherly and Westbury in the same case before the House of Lords regarded it
as a mortgage, L.R. 4 H.L. 317, 324, 335, 336 (1870), although the latter continually refers to
the mortgagee as pledgee. Ibid., at 335-36.
1017 App. Cas. 573 (1882). See also the same judge in Glyn v. East and West India Dock
Co., 7 App. Cas. 591, 604 (1882), and the extremely lucid opinion of Lord Justice Bowen in
Sanders v. Maclean, 11 Q.B.D. 327, 341 (1883).
10210 App. Cas. 74 (1884).
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security of advances was liable to the shipowners for freight and other outstanding charges. The Bills of Lading Act'03 provided:
Every Consignee of Goods named in a Bill of Lading... to whom the Property in the
Goods therein mentioned shall pass, upon or by reason of such Consignment or Indorsement, shall... be subject to the same Liabilities in respect of such Goods as if the
04
Contract contained in a Bill of Lading had been made with himself.

Brett, M.R., in his judgment in the Court of Appeals'05 stated the issue before
the court with extreme precision:
Does the indorsement of a bill of lading as a security for an advance, by a necessary
implication, which cannot be disproved, pass the legal property in the goods named in
the bill of lading to the indorsee, with an equity in the indorser, the borrower, to
1
redeem the bill of lading by payment, or to receive the balance, if any, on a sale?'6

If it did, then, of course, the indorsee-defendant was liable under the Act. In an
elaborate opinion, the Master of the Rolls reiterated his position in Glyn v. East
and WestIndia Dock Co.,107 and vigorously affirmed the position taken by Buller,
J., in Lickbarrow v. Mason. His conception of mercantile practice, like Justice
Buller's, seemed curiously shortsighted and somewhat confused.
Lord Justice Bowen, in a dissenting opinion which was later adopted by the
House of Lords, approached the subject far more pragmatically:
What property, if any, in a cargo afloat passes upon delivery of an indorsed bill of
lading, appears to me to be a question of fact in each case that depends, so far as the
rights between themselves of the immediate parties are concerned, on the express or
implied agreement between them.... The freedom of disposition, which owners of
property possess when their property is on shore, belongs to them equally when it is
afloat. They can if they please sell the bill of lading, or transfer it upon terms which
amount either to a mortgage or to a pledge. For a bill of lading is a symbol of the goods
themselves. The cargo being at sea, no actual delivery of it is possible before the ship
arrives. During this period of flotation and transit the bill of lading becomes and remains a token or symbol of the goods, and the delivery and indorsement of the bill of
lading is equivalent, so far as the passing of property is concerned, to a symbolical
delivery of the goods. Upon principle and reason, therefore, apart from authority, one
would suppose that it is to the agreement between.., them that we should look to
determine the legal consequences that follow on the corporate delivery of the goods.10 8

Lord Justice Bowen saw what neither Justice Buller nor Master of the Rolls
Brett could see, that when the document was transferred as security, the parties
obviously intended a different consequence than if the transfer were made in
103 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111 (1885).
104Ibid., at § 1.
105 Burdick v. Sewell, 13 Q.B.D. 159, 160 (C.A., 1884).
106 Ibid., at 161.
307 6 Q.B.D. 475,480 (C.A., 1880). Compare Sanders v. Maclean, 11 Q.B.D. 327,334 (1883),
in which the same judge departed from justice Buller's pronouncement and made intent the
decisive factor.
108 13 Q.B.D. 159, 170-71 (C.A., 1884).
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pursuance of a bargain and sale. To give legal effect to such an intention as between the same two parties it was unnecessary to go as far as Justice Buller.
The consequences of so doing would completely obscure the distinction between the financing of trade and trading itself, two activities which long before
1884 had separated into their own highly specialized sphere of operation. 109
Notwithstanding Lord Justice Bowen's strong criticism of Lickbarrow v.
Mason, the decision still had nearly a hundred years of authority behind it, plus
all the apparent weight of the House of Lords. It remained, therefore, for Lord
Blackburn in the same House to completely and explicitly nullify its derogatory
effects, and, after ninety-one years, authoritatively to put the curb on the wellmeant but overstated intentions of Justice Buller. On the final appeal of Sewell
v. Burdick, the learned justice emphasized that:
No one, in ordinary language would say that when goods are pawned or money is
raised by mortgage on an estate the property either in the goods or land passed to the
pledgee or mortgagee and I cannot think that the object of the enactment [the Bills
of Lading Act] was to enact that no security for a loan should be taken on the transfer
of bills of lading unless the lender incurred all the liabilities of his borrower on the
contract. That would greatly and I think unnecessarily hamper the business of advancing money on such securities which the legislature has by the Factors Act shown it
thinks ought to be encouraged....
[N]either the statement of the custom of merchants in the special verdict in Lickbarrow v. Mason, nor the opinion of Buller J., justifies the inference that the indorsement of the bill of lading for a valuable consideration must pass the entire legal property, whatever was the intention of the parties.110
Although, in reversing the Court of Appeals, the House of Lords specifically
chose to regard the nature of this particular transfer as a pledge, it is clear that
this was only done to avoid even the remotest possibility of bringing the trade
financier within the operation of the Bills of Lading Act with respect to the
shipping contract contained in the bill of lading itself. To have adopted the
view that the transaction was a mortgage would have been too dangerous in
this particular instance, since it would have been far too easy to have construed
the mortgagee's interest as being the same as the "property" referred to in the
Act."1 It was this, more than anything else, that was responsible for the court's
101 Consult discussion at 265 supra.

110Sewell v. Burdick, 10 App.Cas. 74, 95, 100 (1884).
M As indeed Master of the Rolls Brett, Lord Baggallay and Justice Field had done in the

lower courts. Burdick v. Sewell, 10 Q.B.D. 363 (1883), 13 Q.B.D. 159 (C.A., 1884). In Glyn v.
East and West India Dock Co., 6 Q.B.D. 475, 480 (C.A., 1880), Lord Justice Brett had expressed an opinion that to regard the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading for an advance as a pledge was inconsistent with Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 703
(13th ed., 1929).
As regards the indorsee's right of suit under the bill of lading, this was rightly only accorded
to him when he did some further act to take possession of the goods themselves. See Lord Selboume's opinion in Sewell v. Burdick, 10 App.Cas. 74, 88-89 (1884).
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conceptualizing the security interest and regarding it as a pledge rather than a
112
mortgage.
III. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE FACTOR AS A
FINANCIER OF OVERSEAS TRADE

Although the rise of the factor as a purveyor of credit in the nineteenth century also created problems for the courts, their solution acquired a much greater
sense of urgency than those connected with the instrument of credit itself. This
was not only on account of the importance of the commission merchant in
international trade, but also because the attitude of the law was so out of step
with the changing patterns of dealing in this area as seriously to jeopardize the
entire credit structure of the system.
Much of the trouble stemmed from the old case of Patersonv. Tashk" in which
Chief justice Lee, in examining the activities of the factor, had stated that
although he had power to sell, and thereby bind his principal, he could not bind
or affect the property of the goods by pledging them for his own debt.1 4 Such
a narrow interpretation of the function of the commission merchant, as being
no more than a buying or selling agent, although to some extent understandable
as a mid-eighteenth century view, was hopelessly outdated by the nineteenth
century.
The fact that the full import of this decision was not to become apparent for
more than fifty years resulted in its extension by subsequent decisions to include
transactions involving bills of lading and other indicia of title, in addition to the
goods themselves."' It was only when the importance of the factor began to
increase, and his financial operations to ramify, that the seriousness of the problem created by this rule became apparent. Refusal to allow the commission
merchant the use of his inventory as a means of financing both himself and his
consignor"' threatened to disrupt the entire credit mechanism of overseas
17
trade.
11 Lord Blackburn pointed out that in his opinion the rights were in substance the same
whether the transfer was regarded as a pledge or a mortgage. He refused to say, however,
whether a mortgagee's interest would, in these circumstances, bring the indorsee within the
provisions of the Bills of Lading Act. Ibid., at 103.
1132 Str. 1178 (K.B., 1743).
114There are a number of grounds for maintaining that Paterson v. Tash, 2 Str. 1178 (K.B.,
1743), was really no authority for this rule. Chief justice Gibb stated that it had been misreported. Par. Papers, Report on Merchants, 1823, 75, 769. And it has been suggested that
there was some form of collusion between the factor and the pledgee. Pearson-Gee, The New
Factors Acts 3 n. (c) (1889).
116For cases in which the rule was applied to documents representing goods, see Newsom v.
Thornton, 6 East 17 (K.B., 1805); Shipley v. Kymer, 1 M. & S. 484 (K.B., 1813); Graham v.
Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1 (K.B., 1817); Barton v. Williams, 5 B. & A. 395 (K.B., 1822). In Pultney
v. Keymer, 3 Esp. 182 (N.P., 1800), however, Lord Eldon ignored it entirely.
I'6 Except, of course, where there was actual authority from the consigning owner.
117 Consult discussion at 258-63 supra.
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As a result of this situation, Parliament set up a select committee in 1823 to
examine the law relating to merchants, agents and factors, the outcome of which
was the adoption in the same year of what was destined to be but the first of a
series of Factors Acts"" designed to abrogate the rule in Patersonv. Task and to
give adequate recognition and protection to the operations of the commission
merchant. The enactment of 1823 was concerned solely with the immediate
problem of safeguarding the interests of both the financier who advanced
against the factor's inventory, and the consignor whose commission agent had
become bankrupt while still in possession of the consignor's goods. While the
Act appeared to show some appreciation of the inadequacy of the law from a
mercantile point of view, in effect, it did very little to offset the rule of Paterson
v. Tash."9 It did, however, permit a factor to transfer his lien upon a consignment against which he had made advances by pledging the goods or bill of lading,'20 therebyreversing the old commonlawrule that a pledge by a factor of goods
in his possession was so tortious as to prevent the passing of even his own lien.''
The shortcomings of this legislation were so obvious that two years later
Parliament amended the Act. 22 After confirming the provisions of the earlier
statute protecting the consignee's lien as against the consignor, the amendnients
increased the rights which the pledgee might obtain by providing that his interest in the goods extended to their entire value and not just to the pledgor's
interest therein." s Lack of notice by the pledgee of the factor's limited interest
in the goods was, as in the previous statute, retained as a condition, 24 but the
amendments further changed the earlier Act by providing that even though the
pledgee had notice, his interest was valid to the extent of the factor-pledgor's
lien on the goods. 25 While the amendments represented a step forward from
the Act of 1823, to a banker or financier accustomed to dealing in this sphere
with any frequency, the safeguards provided were all but useless. As the Act
stood, and as the bench was subsequently to construe it, its real accomplish] 4 Geo. IV, c. 83 (1823). Thevarious acts following the 1823 statute were as follows: 6 Geo.
IV, c. 94 (1825); 5 & 6 Vict., c. 39 (1842); and 40 &41 Vict., c. 39 (1877). The last Act, 52 & 53
Vict., c. 45 (1889), was a codification of the previous statutes.
MOne legal writer, however, regarded the Act as considerably modifying the then existing
law. Russell, A Treatise on Mercantile Agency 100 (2d ed., 1873).
120Geo. IV, c. 83, § 2 (1823).
2 Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T.R. 604 (K.B., 1794). In connection with this lien between consignor and consignee, Lord Blackburn pointed out in 1883: "flits [the Factors Act of 1823] provisions have, in practice, been found to work so harmoniously with the practice of merchants
that I am not aware that any case has ever arisen requiring a court of law to construe it."
Mildred v Maspons, 8 App.Cas. 874,884 (1883).
m6 Geo. IV, c. 94 (1825).
-3 Ibid., at § 2.
L4 Ibid.

Ibid., at § 5. This right was also the same where the security was given for a pre-existing
debt. Ibid., at § 3. As to what constituted a pre-existing debt within the Act see Jewan v.
Whitworth, L.R. 2 Eq. 692 (Ch., 1866); Macnee v. Gorst, L.R. 4 Eq. 315 (Ch., 1867).
15
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ment was negligible as regards abrogating the rule of the Paterson case.
The English courts showed no disposition to relax the constricting rules of the
common law as regards the pledging of goods or documents by the factor. In
fact such a completely literal interpretation of the statute was adopted that they
all but reduced the financier to his former insecure position. Their reading of the
Act did nothing to avoid the difficulties that bad draftsmanship was capable of
creating; and it ultimately resulted in placing several distinct barriers between
the would-be trade financier and a safe and satisfactory security.
Under Section 2 of the Act, for the financier to obtain the benefits of his
security, it was essential that he should not have notice that the person pledging
the documents was not the actual owner of them. In construing this section, the
justices followed exactly the same rule as was laid down at common law prior
to the Act. "Notice" was construed as including any circumstance which would
cause a reasonable man to believe that the goods or documents offered as securi12 7
ty were not the property of the person so offering them.
Apart from this provision, which, together with its construction, more or less
negated any advantages which the Act may have had, the courts proceeded to
attach further excrescences to the statute which limited its effect even further.
Section 2, besides containing the notice provision, also provided "that any person intrusted with, and in possession of any bill of lading, India warrant, dock
warrant, warehouse keeper's certificate, wharfinger's certificate, warrant or
order for the delivery of goods, shall be deemed and taken to be the true owner
thereof," so as, inter alia, to give him the power of pledging the same. The distinction made by the legislature between the words "intrusting" and "possession" indicated that the former implied something more than the latter, but the
content of the distinction remained for the courts to decide. The first important
decision on this subject was Close v. Holmes.' The plaintiffs had been in the
habit of employing one H, a commission agent who resided in Hull, and making
consignments of goods to him to sell for their account. Holmes, the defendant,
was the registered officer of The Hull Banking Company. In the months of
,6The Act, however, did show some recognition of the difference in function between
financier and trader by allowing the owner of the goods to re-obtain them from the former on
satisfying the factor's lien. 6 Geo. IV, c. 94, §6. This, of course, was not very satisfactory from
the financier's point of view as conceivably the sums advanced by the commission merchant
to the owner were far less than those advanced by the financier to the factor on the same
security.
12
7Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East 17 (K.B., 1805); Graham v. Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1 (K.B.,
1817); Evans v. Trueman, 1 M. & Rob. 10 (N.P., 1830); Taylor v. Trueman, M. & M. 453
(N.P., 1830). It was this, of course, which made the effect of the Act negligible in abrogating
the rule in the Paterson case. The growing dominance of the consignment pattern of dealing
in overseas trade at this time made it virtually impossible for a reasonable man to be unaware
that the goods and documents offered to him as security were more than likely the property
of someone other than the party seeking the advance, especially as those commission merchants who could afford to buy or sell on their own account were generally strong enough not
to seek such advances. Consult discussion at 260-62 supra.
-8 2 M. & Rob. 22 (N.P., 1837).
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January and February, 1835, two ships arrived at Hull with cargoes consigned
by the plaintiffs to H for sale on their account. The bills of lading were indorsed
in blank by the shippers and transferred to H. H had the goods landed, and warehoused both cargoes in his own name. In June, 1835, H applied to the banking
company for an advance of money. The request was granted and H obtained
from the warehouse company a written acknowledgment that the cargo warehoused on their premises was being held to the order of the banking company.
Upon receipt of this acknowledgment, the bank gave H its acceptance for five
hundred pounds. The banking company later made a further advance on the
cargo, this time on the security of the delivery order. On neither occasion did H
produce the bills of lading.
In their action for trover, the plaintiffs replied to the defendant's contention
that the bank held the goods under the Factors Act, by maintaining that, as
the Act only gave protection to pledges by the factor of the specific documents
of title with which the principal had entrusted his agent, Section 2 did not
apply. Here the defendants had made advances on a delivery order and a warehouse receipt, neither of which documents had actually been "intrusted" to the
factor. All the factor had obtained from his principal were bills of lading, and,
therefore, the plaintiffs argued that it was upon the latter documents and these
alone that a valid pledge could be made. Baron Alderson, who tried the case,
upheld this contention, and pointed out that for the defendant to come within
the Act he must clearly show that H had actually been entrusted with the property pledged, a fact of which there was obviously no evidence in the case under
consideration.
This conservatism was by no means peculiar to Baron Alderson. It reflected
generally the opinions of a bench which saw the concept of "ownership" almost
solely in terms of land law and to whom the preservation of such a concept was
of paramount importance." 9 When the same point arose again in Phillips v.
Hulk, ' where dock warrants had been issued as collateral instead of the original
bills of lading, exactly the same result occurred. In this particular case the Court
of Exchequer went so far as to overturn the findings of a jury that the documents
pledged had been "intrusted" to the factor and to grant a new trial. Baron
Parke, in delivering the judgment, elaborated the rationale upon which this
construction of the statute rested:
Intrustingwith the document is essentially different from enabling a person to become
possessed of it-from giving him the means of obtaining it.... It is not enough, therefore, to shew that the plaintiffs empowered Warwick, or Warwick & Clagett [the factors], to possess themselves of the warrants whenever they chose; it must be shewn
that the plaintiffs really intended that the factors should be possessed of them at the
129For examples of this general conservatism and the opposition to the passing of the Factors Acts, consult 9 Parl. Deb. 211, 256 (Set. 2, 1823). But cf. Williams v. Barton, 3 Bing. 139,
145 (Ex. Ch., 1825).
10 6 M. & W. 572 (Ex., 1840).
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time they pledged them, or it must be shewn that the plaintiffs meant them not merely
to have the power which the possession of the bill of lading would give-of getting the
warrants when they [the plaintiffs] liked, but to exercise that power by obtaining it,
whenever they [the factors] in theirdiscretion might think fit. If either of these intentions
were proved, it would be sufficient."'
By placing the burden upon the banker of ascertaining the intention of the
principal, the court, far from alleviating the deleterious effects of Paterson v.
Tash, only added to the financier's burden. Under the common law, he had been
required to ascertain only if the factor had the authority of his principal to
pledge in order to protect himself. With the passing of the Factors Acts, however, he was compelled first to try to define correctly what the word "intrusting" meant, and then, having done this, to attempt to deduce from all the circumstances whether or not the factor's possession of the documents came within
this meaning. Furthermore, the courts, by distinguishing at this stage between
"goods" and "documents of title""1 2 as collateral for loans, had increased the
financier's original burden by making such tasks cumulative rather than alternative courses of action.
Another obstacle erected by the courts emanated from the very narrow construction placed upon the phrase "security for any money or negotiable instrument or instruments advanced" in Section 2 of the Act. In Taylor v. Trueman,3 3
the defendants, who had financed M and Company, a firm of commission merchants, were sued by the latter's principal for conversion of certain dock warrants. M and Company were instructed to purchase and did actually purchase
for the plaintiff certain chests of indigo, lying in the warehouses of the East
India Company, for which they subsequently obtained warrants. Prior to this,
M and Company had borrowed a large sum of money from the defendant and
had deposited with the latter other East India warrants for other indigo as
collateral. Requiring some of the latter indigo, they applied to the defendants
for the release of some of the warrants, on a promise to pay their value during
the course of the day. Ml and Company failed to do this and instead deposited
ten of the plaintiff's warrants as security. It was on account of these latter
documents that the plaintiff brought this action in trover.
13 6 Mf. & W. 572, 598 (Ex., 1840). Also examine Hatfield v. Phillips, 9 Al. & W. 647 (Ex.
Ch., 1842) (especially the judgment of Lord Denman at 648), aff'd 14 M. & W. 665 (H.L.,
1845).
12 Phillips v. Hluth, 6 Al. & W. 572 (Ex., 1840); Hatfield v. Phillips, 9 M. & W. 647 (Ex.
Ch., 1842). In these two cases the courts had limited the Act to those instances where the factor had in his hands some document which showed title to the specific goods. Possession of the
goods themselves by the factor did not bring the latter within the Act. This meant, of course,
that where the factor attempted to pledge goods in his warehouse, the rule of Paterson v. Tash,
2 Str. 1178 (K.B., 1743), still operated. Prior to the passing of the Act no attempt had been
made when applying Paterson v. Tash to distinguish goods from documents of title. To some
extent such a distinction could have been accepted if it had been used to circumvent rather
than enforce the rule.
13 1 M. & M1. 453 (N.P., 1830).
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In allowing the plaintiff to recover, Lord Tenterden stated:
Holding the warrants originally deposited with them as securities, the defendants
gave them up, and received the warrants in question in exchange. This does not appear
to me a transaction within the second section of the statute.... It is no "pledge or
deposit of them as a security for money advanced on the face of them," for the money
for which they are a security was previously due, namely on the former transactions,
for which they were exchanged came into the hands of the
when the warrants
134
defendants.
No doubt the courts were correct in refusing to extend the meaning of the
phrase "negotiable instrument or instruments advanced" to include documents
of title; but it would not have required much imagination and legal flexibility
to have brought the exchange of collateral within the operation of the Act. Fifteen minutes walk from the courts of Westminster to the City of London and
Lombard Street were all that were needed to have revealed how common a
practice was this substitution of security.
It was obvious that with so many legal impediments, the financing of inter-.
national trade was in danger of being seriously impaired. As a result of this
situation, Parliament passed yet a further statute "to alter and amend"' 3 5 the
previous Act, and "to extend the Provisions thereof, and to put the Law on a
dear and certain Basis.'13 6 The first important step taken by the new Act was
specifically to overturn the rule laid down in Patersonv. Task. The Act provided:
Any agent who shall ... be intrusted with the possession of goods, or of the documents
of title to goods, shall be deemed and taken to be owner of such goods and documents,
so far as to give validity to any contract or agreement by way of pledge, lien, or security
bona fide made by any person with such agent so intrusted... and such contract or
agreement shall be binding upon and good amongst the owner of such goods, and all
other persons interested therein, notwithstanding such pledge or lien may have had
the person with whom such contract or agreement is made is only an
notice that
137
agent.
In addition, the restriction under which the courts had previously prevented
the exchange of collateral from coming within the Act was removed,'38 as was
the unreal distinction between those documents of title which were and those
which were not derived immediately from the owner. 119
" Ibid., at 455-56. See also Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. &A. 320 (K.B., 1832).
15 Preamble, 5 &6 Vict., c. 39, § 1 (1842).
137 5 & 6 Vict., c. 39, § 1 (1842).
16 Ibid.
'M

Ibid., at § 2.

"' Phillips v. Huth, 6 M. &W. 572 (Ex., 1840). The new Act stated that "any agent intrusted... and possessed of any such document of title, whether derived immediately from
the owner of such goods, or obtained by reason of such agent's having been intrusted with
possession of the goods, or of any document of title thereto, shall be deemed and taken to have
been intrusted with the possession of the goods represented by such documents of title as
aforesaid." 5 &6 Vict., c. 39, §4 (1842).
The Act also extended its protection to advances made on goods as well as documents of
title. Ibid., at § 1. Section 4 listed the types and essential elements of these "documents of
title."
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Although showing a far more realistic approach to aiding the merchant or
banking community, Parliament still had not improved upon its drafting technique. The applicability of the Act still depended upon the transactions involving agents "intrusted with the Possession of Goods... or of Documents of Title
thereto.''140 The difficulties created by the use of this wording in the prior acts
14
apparently had not deterred Parliament from again adopting it. '
justice Blackburn, in the case of Cole v. The North Western Bank"' gives the
most lucid and comprehensive description of these difficulties. The facts of this
case afford an excellent illustration of the legal snares and pitfalls which lay in
the path of the banker who was embarking upon this type of financial enterprise. 43 The plaintiffs, merchants in London, were the owners of two parcels of
sheep's wool and two parcels of mohair or goats' wool. All four parcels were received for the plaintiffs by one Slee, a warehouseman and sheep's wool broker at
Liverpool, and were by him deposited in his own warehouse at Liverpool. The
wool was taken by the defendants pursuant to an agreement by which Slee
pledged or agreed to pledge all four parcels to the defendants for £7,000 advanced to him. At the time when the contract was made, two parcels of goats'
wool and one of the parcels of sheep's wool were in Slee's warehouse. The other
parcel of sheep's wool was still on board the vessel by which it had been shipped
originally; but Slee held the bill of lading which had been sent to him by the
plaintiffs to enable him to land and deposit the wool in his warehouse. Slee
absconded with the £7,000 which he had obtained, and the defendant, having
notice that Slee had committed this act of bankruptcy, but not having any
notice that he had not been so "intrusted" with possession of the goods so as
40
1 Ibid., at § 1.
141There was, of course, one major drafting change in this particular provision, and that
was the substitution of the word "agent" for "person." The same problem still existed, however. Bennett, op. cit. supra note 64, at 26, points out that the use of the word "intrusted" in
all the acts prior to that of 1889, was the subject of so much judicial consideration that it was
not reproduced in the 1889 draft. In examining the 1889 Act, Bennett, therefore, considered it
unnecessary to examine the previous cases on this point.
Section 2 of the 1889 Act, however, reads: "Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent
of the owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any sale, pledge or
other disposition of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course of business
of a mercantile agent, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same." 52 & 53 Vict., c. 45, § 2 (1859).
The change in language was only formal; the financier was, and still is, in the position of
having to insure that the factor is acting qua factor and not in any other capacity, and this,
in effect, poses the same problems as the "intrusting" situation. See, for example, Cole v.
North Western Bank, L.R. 10 C.P. 354 (Ex. Ch., 1875), discussed above. A comparatively
recent case on the point is Staffs Motor Guarantee, Ltd. v. British Wagon Co., [1934] 2 K.B.
305.
One of the reasons why this problem has resulted in so few cases in the present century is
the great change in the trading patterns which occurred toward the end of the nineteenth
century. An examination of the cases occurring after 1900 in which the courts had to construe
the Factors Act of 1889 shows that nearly all of them involve domestic sales by such people
as automobile dealers. Consult discussion at 265-66 supra.
14 L.R. 10 C.P. 354 (Ex. Ch., 1875).
143The greatest care is, of course, still required from the merchant banker.
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to be able to pledge them, took forcible possession of all the goods against the
144
will of Slee's clerical staff.
In an action to determine the rights of the parties to the goods, Blackburn
pointed out:
The great question was whether Slee was, under the circumstances so intrusted with
the possession of the goods as to have been able... (supposing he had then delivered
actual possession to the defendants) to make a pledge to the defendants' goods against
the plaintiffs. As to this, there is a distinction between the sheep's wool and the goats'
wool; for, Slee never sold goats' wool at all, and was dearly intrusted with the goats'
and as warehouseman only. But he did sell sheep's wool as a
wool as14warehouseman,
5
broker.
In an exhaustive review of the history of the Acts, and the decisions upon them,
Lord Blackburn found that as Slee had been "intrusted" not as a broker but
as a warehouseman, the defendants could not plead protection of the Factors
Acts and the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to recover.
Replying to the argument put forth by defending counsel that "the object of
the legislature was, to afford facilities for safely making advances; and that this
object was only imperfectly carried out if an advance made under such circumstances.., was not protected" and "that the defendants had no means of
knowing whether Slee was possessed as a warehouseman or as a broker,"' 4 Lord
Blackburn pointed out that certainly as regards the mohair, the argument was
invalid. He stated:
[I]nquiry would have made the defendants aware that Slee was not a broker for mohair
at all. As regards the sheep's wool, however, there is force in the arguments that the defendants might, without much negligence, be led by Slee to believe that he was intrusted with the sheep's wool as a broker. But, if the plaintiffs knew that the warehouseman whom they trusted was also a wool-broker, the defendants were aware that
the wool-broker whom they trusted was also a warehouseman; and there seems no
reason why without inquiry they should think he was intrusted in one capacity rather
than the other.
Probably 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39 § 4, requires us to treat him as being so intrusted, unless
the contrary is shewn in evidence. But we are all of opinion that in this case the plaintiffs have shewn in evidence... that Slee was not intrusted as broker, but solely as
warehouseman. We do not think that the legislature wished to give to all sales and
pledges in the ordinary course of business the effect which the common law gives to
sales in market overt.147 If such had been their object, it could easily have been so

48
enacted in terms; which certainly has not been done.
144
These facts are taken from Lord Blackburn's judgment. Ibid., at 357.
145 Ibid., at 358.
46
1 Ibid., at 371.
147 It is interesting in this connection to reflect how and why the law of market overt de-

veloped in the first place. The creation of the law of market overt and the demand for the "Factors Acts" are in part different solutions to the same problem; i.e., deciding which of two innocent parties is to suffer for the fault of a third. In the Middle Ages, the difficulty was resolved solely in favor of the itinerant merchant trading at the great markets and fairs in Eng-
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A careful reading of this judgment shows without a doubt that, apart from
the pressure of prior authority, the learned judge was exercising a deliberate
policy choice in adopting such an interpretation. The burden of inquiry which
was placed upon the banker was one which the judge thought he should rightfully bear14 and one which it behooved the prudent financier to accept of his own
volition. 1
That such leeway under the phrasing of the 1842 Act was not always possible, however, was shown by the case of Fuentes v. Montis s0 where the wording
of an "agent who shall be intrusted with possession, etc." was again considered.
The case was an interpleader issue directed ,to determine the rights of the litigants to a cargo of wine. The plaintiffs who had consigned a quantity of wine
to a factor for sale, having become dissatisfied with him as their agent, terminated his authority and instructed him to hand over the wines to another agent.
The factor unlawfully refused to comply with these instructions, and while in
wrongful possession of the wines, pledged the dock warrants representing them
to the defendants for advances. The defendants pleaded their lien under the
Factors Acts.
Both justice Blackburn (in Assizes) and justice Willes (in the Common
Pleas) found in favor of the plaintiffs. That two judges of such obvious commercial acumen should have been instrumental in placing such a burden on the
banking community is somewhat hard to understand.' No doubt to construe
"intrusted" to include "having been intrusted" was made difficult by the wording of the statute, but it was by no means an impossible construction. 15 A possible explanation for their action lies in the vast amount of speculation in this
type of collateral which was and had been occurring during this period, 153 and a
desire on the part of the bench to introduce a measure of prudence in such dealings. Whether or not this was, in fact, the reason, the net effect of this decision
land. Later, with the emergence of big, organized, and highly specialized institutions, and a
division of mercantile functions between trader and banker, a compromise solution evolved
resulting in division of responsibility among the two major groups involved. For a general
description of trading in the Middle Ages, consult 2 Cambridge Economic History of Europe,
c. 4 (1952).
148 Cole v. The North Western Bank, L.R. 10 C.P. 354, 371-72 (Ex. Ch., 1875).
149 Lord Blackburn was also undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the old consignment
method of dealing was still, even at this time, the regular method of trading in wool, and that
dealing in this commodity was veryhighly specialized. Consult Clapham, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 317.
150 L.R. 3 C.P. 268 (1868), aff'd L.R. 4 C.P. 93 (Ex. Ch., 1868).
51It is even more difficult to comprehend when one recalls that, under the common law,
if plaintiffs contracted to sell goods to defendants and actually sold them, plaintiffs would have
been bound by the contract. See Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. & E. 589 (Q.B., 1840).
162 Lord Blackburn's judgment is not available; but Justice Willes's discomfort is obvious.
See Fuentes v. Montis, 3 C.P. 268, 283 (1868).
'53 Consult discussion at 262 supra.
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was to place the financier in virtually the same position as he had been when
Patersonv. Tash was still law. The nature of the inquiry might be different; its
extent was still the same.
Despite the obvious difficulties which this case created, the mercantile community appeared to be relatively undisturbed by it. In fact, it was not until
almost ten years later that any attempt was made to overturn the decision. The
reasons for this lack of concern are, of course, not hard to determine. The decline
of the consignment transaction in the 1850's and 1860's marked the end of the
factor's pre-eminence in the field of international trade, both as a purveyor of
credit and as a buying and selling agent. This, combined with the emergence of
trading to order as the general pattern of dealing, meant that questions of the
factor's "authority" and his "intrusting" no longer created anxiety in the trade
financier as regards the safety of his collateral. Thus it was not until the adop1 54
tion of a new Factors Act in 1877 that the decision was overturned.
Although this delay was indicative of these changing methods of trade and
finance, of far greater significance in this respect were the new provisions of the
1877 Act which enlarged the scope of the phrase "person intrusted" to include
the buyer or seller of goods who was allowed to remain in control of the documents of title of which he was not owner.155 Not only did they more clearly
reflect these developments, but they also showed the new and particular
type of difficulty which was accompanying them. The 1877 Act itself as a whole,
however, still preserved many of the older legal pitfalls for the merchant banker,
as, indeed, did the final codifying legislation which superseded it in 1889.58
Fortunately, with the factor's decline as the dominant figure in foreign trade,
many of these legislative defects lost much of their importance. By and large
they no longer had any reference to the patterns of trade and finance which
then existed.
IV. CONCLUSION

Though the courts eventually managed, with the aid of the legislature, to
resolve the problems presented by documentary finance and factorage, it is evident that they were ill-equipped conceptually to meet the demands of the new
economic order. The fact that Justice Buller's opinion in Lickbarrow v. Mason
was accepted side by side with Paterson v. Tash is itself one of the most obvious
indications of the confused thinking which prevailed during this period. If, as
Justice Buller contended in Lickbarrow v. Mason, the indorsement and delivery
of the bill of lading ipso facto passed the entire property in the goods, then
dearly the factor's right to use the document as security for his own debts was
beyond question. The adoption of such a position, however, would have neces154 40 & 41 Vict., c. 39, § 2 (1877).

at §§ 3, 4.
156 For a general discussion of the 1889 Act (52 & 53 Vict., c. 45), consult Neish and Carter, The Factors Act, 1889 (1890); Bowstead's Digest of the Law of Agency, 188 (11th ed.,
1951); Bennett, op. cit. note 64, at 25-34.
155 Ibid.,

1957]

BILLS OF LADING AND FACTORS IN OVERSEAS TRADE

291

sitated a virtual denial of the existence of the factorage operation. It would
have put the consigning owner in the position of having to regard the factor's
advances not as a loan but as the purchase price for the goods. Presumably,
it was to avoid this absurdity that the courts ignored justice Buller's opinion
when faced with a problem in which the Paterson v. Task doctrine was controlling.
No doubt the fluidity of the commercial situation encouraged the judiciary
to adhere to those concepts with which they were familiar; but so long as they
persisted in regarding "property" as indivisible, it was impossible for them to
give effective recognition to the requirements of trade finance. This attitude,
as a commentary upon the legal approach to mercantile questions, provides
one explanation as to why those engaged in international trade have always
preferred, wherever possible, to utilize machinery other than the formal legal
17
system to resolve their disputes. 1
157
6 Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, this extra-legal machinery has been provided by arbitration. In former times it was provided by the fair courts of Piepowder. Consult
Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 61, at 622. It is perhaps worth noting that the first inroad into
the Lickbarrow doctrine was made in a case arising out of an arbitration proceeding. In Re
Westzinthus, 5 B. & A. 817 (K.B., 1833) (discussed at 274 supra).

